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Most serious studies of "globalization" quickly derail into simple 
analyses of the immediately identifiable global institutions and 
actors, with little inquiry into the deeper interrelationships animating 
them. We associate globalization with increased trade,1 or broader 
cross-cultural contact,2 or perhaps with "Americanization,"3 but none 
1. Both cntics and proponents of "globalization" understand trade-economic 
"openness"-as key to globalization. See, e.g., PHILIPPE AGHION & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, 
GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND GLOBALIZATION: THEORY, HISTORY, AND POLICY (1998); 
KEVIN H. O'ROURKE & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBALIZATION AND HISTORY: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC ECONOMY (1999). For a critical view, 
see DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997). 
2. Consider the flurry of recent work in political and cultural theory assessing new 
demands for cultural recognition, in multicultural societies and in global discourse more 
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of these fits precisely. What we lack is an analysis of globalization 
that inquires into the deeper currents transforming the contem-
porary world. 
In a provocative answer to that lack, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri's Empire constructs a sweeping, theoretically rich account of 
the nature of globalization. Hardt and Negri argue that we live in a 
new global hegemony, which they call "Empire," a system of govern-
ing principles without bounds, neoliberalism ascendant.4 In calling 
the emerging global order "Empire," they seek to evoke the world of 
ancient Rome rather than the European imperialist projects of 
recent centuries.5 Unlike those nation-based empires, our current 
world order more closely resembles the ancient empires, understood 
as moral and legal frameworks operative over an expansive, fluctuat-
ing territory. Similarly, Empire has no demarcated territory: it is 
characterized by a denial of limits, territorial or otherwise, to its ex-
pansion. 
Hardt and Negri explore this "Empire" in its many forms: its 
emerging international legal order with its challenge to conventional 
national sovereignty;6 its economy, based on new forms of network-
ed, global production; its politics with new sources of legitimacy and 
power. In so doing, they outline an unconventional intellectual 
history of modernity, from the Renaissance to the late twentieth cen-
tury. They also explore in detail the new "subjectivities" -the forms 
of identity and self-understanding-that emerge in Empire, situating 
their argument within ongoing postmodern and post-Marxist dis-
courses. Analysis on such a grand scale necessarily borrows much 
from others, particularly contemporary European social theorists.7 
broadly. See, e.g., ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF 
GLOBALIZATION (1995); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THE-
ORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); CHARLES 
TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION: AN ESSAY (Amy Gut-
man ed., 1992). Such important work in political and cultural theory rarely makes its way into 
more popular treatises on "globalization." 
3. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: How GLOBALIZATION JS RESHAPING 
OUR LIVES 33 (2000). 
4. Alain Touraine has argued that the movement against "globalization" should really be a 
contest over global neoliberalism. See ALAIN TOURAINE, BEYOND NEOLJBERALISM (2001). 
See also JOHN GRA Y,FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998). 
5. On the history of different forms of empire and imperial expansion, see, for example, 
MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES (1986); ANTHONY PAGDEN, PEOPLES AND EMPIRES (2001). 
6. Hardt and Negri's analysis of the decline of national sovereignty borrows from the work 
of sociologist Saskia Sassen, among others. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOV-
EREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996). 
7. They are indebted particularly to Michel Foucault, from whom they borrow such ideas 
as biopower, and to Deleuze and Guattari, whose theoretical approach Hardt and Negri adopt 
in considering globalization. See GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND PLA-
TEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1987); 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY (1988), Hardt and Negri's theory of sovereignty is borrowed from GIORGIO 
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The resulting argument is complex and nuanced, but sometimes 
difficult to follow and maddeningly impenetrable. 
The book has its problems, and the central arguments can be lost 
in poorly considered prose and a style at once highly abstract and 
bombastic. In one passage, we are encouraged to recognize ourselves 
as the "simians and cyborgs we are,"8 and elsewhere, we are told of 
the "joy of being a communist."9 Frequently, the reader is subjected 
to awkward, jargonistic prose that no high theoretic commitments 
can justify. The shame is that the argument hidden by such language 
merits consideration. 
LOGICS OF EMPIRE 
Hardt and Negri argue that Empire constitutes a form of govern-
ance without government. Where Empire expands, it replicates a 
series of social orderings without relying on a territorial core. Empire 
consists of various "logics" -for example, the logic of capital, the 
logic of police intervention, and the logic of networked or post-in-
dustrial production.10 These logics can be established anywhere, thus 
breaking down the old distinction between core and periphery in 
favor of a resolutely global terrain; they do not depend on any exist-
ing political or juridical formation, such as United States military 
power or the World Trade Organization, even as they motivate the 
creation of these institutions and articulate their purposes. 
Framing the argument in terms of globalizing logics puts national 
sovereignty in the background, but Hardt and Negri do not see states 
as actors playing a game whose rules they cannot control.11 Rather, 
they resuscitate Polybius's vision of the tripartite constitution of the 
Roman Empire and update it to the present day, suggesting a "pyra-
mid of global constitution."12 In their version, the monarchical power 
consists of the United States monopoly on military force and the G-7 
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998), a complex and inter-
esting book adapting Carl Schmitt's idea of sovereignty and Arendt's and Foucault's visions of 
political life to describe the current world political order. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1985). 
8. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 92 (2000). 
9. Id. at 413. 
10. Hardt and Negri claim that the world is being integrated "by conforming to the struc-
tural logics that are active in the construction of Empire, such as the police and military logics 
(or really the repression of potential subversive forces in the context of imperial peace), the 
economic logics (the imposition of the market, which in turn is ruled by the monetary regime), 
and the ideological and communicative logics." Id at 341. 
11. See, e.g., GIDDENS, supra note 3, and SASSEN, supra note 6. 
12. The argument is not that this constitution consists of "ordering elements" but "ma-
trixes that delimit relatively coherent horizons in the disorder of global juridical and political 
life." The pyramid is, in other words, a metaphor and analytic tool more than a description of a 
clear-cut order. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 309. 
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monopoly over the terms of global monetary policy and exchange. 
The aristocratic function, made up of nation-states and multinational 
corporations, distributes monarchical control broadly across the 
world. The people are represented in the pyramid through represen-
tative organizations-NGOs, the media, certain global forums-
which constitute the "popular" function. 13 In this more complex ren-
dering, Hardt and Negri reject both the state-centered view of tradi-
tional analysis and the pervading critical view, which often imagines 
globalization as a straightforward expansion of corporate power 
overtaking the state.14 However, perhaps more attracted by the 
aesthetics of this concept than its analytics, they do never clearly de-
lineate the nature of the interlinkages between these functions of the 
pyramidal constitution of Empire. 
Empire's Juridical Structure 
The description of the new global order as "Empire" implies a 
post-national conception of sovereignty, which Hardt and Negri see 
developing out of the demand for international interventions and the 
necessity of supranational juridical scaffolding that is capable of sup-
porting such interventions. As they explain, "All conflicts, all crises, 
and all dissensions effectively push forward the process of integra-
tion and by the same measure call for more central authority."15 
Thus, the military interventions in Kosovo, the IMF bailout of Indo-
nesia and Thailand during the 'East Asian Crisis,' and recent human-
itarian missions in Africa are all justified on a new, explicitly supra-
national morality, supported by discourses that both draw on and 
reinforce our sense of global community and international inter-
dependence. As they put it, "moral intervention has become a front-
line force of imperial intervention."16 
Consider an exemplary current example, the global anti-terror 
campaign of the United States, "Operation Enduring Freedom," a 
transnational mission against a diffuse and shifting enemy in which 
all states must decide, as President Bush has put it, whether they are 
with America or "with the terrorists."11 This multifaceted operation 
13. Hardt and Negri treat all NGOs as complicit in the imperial order. In doing so, 
however, they neglect the enormous proliferation of grassroots NGOs (particularly in the 
developing world), without links to transnational media, foundations, or international organi-
zations. Their blanket dismissal seems particularly unfounded, given the deeply reformist aims 
they suggest for "counter-imperial" action. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
14. See, for example, DAVID KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (1995), 
for this latter view. 
15. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 14. 
16. Id at 36. 
17. In his September 20, 2001 address following the events of September 11, President 
Bush stated, "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us 
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pushes forward international integration, not only in the military 
cooperation it demands, but also in the articulation of national poli-
cies and rhetoric and the drive to incorporate the entire world into a 
single discourse about the idea of terrorism that presupposes the 
right of intervention across the global stage. 
Thus, Empire is legitimated on a new idea of right without limits. 
Such a right to intervene-in economic, strategic, humanitarian 
crises-necessarily undermines national sovereignty and the power 
of nation-states as the building blocks of the international order. In 
their place, Hardt and Negri point to an emerging transnational con-
sensus imbued with a sovereign legitimacy.18 This consensus emerges 
from a series of global discourses-for example, on science, security, 
human rights, and development-that motivate the framework for a 
new global order. Hence, "Empire is not born of its own will but 
rather is called into being and constituted on the basis of its capacity 
to resolve conflicts. "19 Every pressure group, every demand, every 
call on the highest powers-the monarchical powers, in Hardt and 
Negri's framework-pushes forward a new moral, imperial order 
overtaking the traditional sovereignty of states. 
Empire-S American Roots 
In tracing the beginnings of Empire, Hardt and Negri turn to the 
United States: the "contemporary idea of Empire is born through the 
global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project."20 They 
examine several aspects of the U.S. Constitution, particularly the 
"tendency toward an open, expansive project operating on an 
unbounded terrain. "21 
The notion of unboundedness appears throughout their analysis of 
Empire, and they trace it back to the American experience. What 
precisely is "unbounded" about this experience, however, is left un-
clear. Do they mean geographic unboundedness, in the sense of an 
ever-shifting western frontier, or the idea of a political project that 
does not recognize the distinction between inside and outside, based 
on principles of universal scope?22 The latter explanation conforms 
or you are with the terrorists." Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Pledges Attack on Afghanistan 
Unless it Surrenders Bin Laden Now, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at 1. 
18. By sovereign here, Hardt and Negri borrow from Carl Schmitt the idea that sov-
ereignty is the right to "decide the exception," to intervene in the crisis for which 'normal' law 
has no answer. See SCHMITT, supra note 7. See alsoAGAMBEN, supra note 7. 
19. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 15. 
20. Id at 182. By "constitution" here they do not mean the literal constitutional text but 
the broader idea of the constitution as understood in political theory, the established political 
and social compact, the way in which the British have a constitution. 
21. Id. at 161. 
22. And if the latter, they do not further distinguish the incorporation of new units through 
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better to their analysis of Empire, but does not necessarily fit lengthy 
periods of American history nor does it comport with their emphasis 
on terrain. 
Hardt and Negri argue that Empire emerges from this American 
experience with the organization of an open-ended space according 
to central principles, which then are projected globally through the 
liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson.23 Wilsonian interna-
tionalism corresponds "to the original logic of the U.S. Constitution 
and its idea of expansive Empire. "24 In this, our "American Cen-
tury," we should not be surprised to see our constitutional model 
articulated globally in the new world order. 
Yet, however much Empire may be indebted to the American con-
stitutional experience, Hardt and Negri maintain that we do not live 
in an American empire. They resist seeing America as "the new 
Rome," as many anti-globalization activists understand it, even while 
they understand that it is "privileged" in Empire's development. This 
denial of American hegemony seems driven by Hardt and Negri's 
refusal of the idea of a "center" in what they argue is a center-less 
global phenomenon; as a result, they fail to grapple with the Ameri-
can bias in global neoliberalism. We may recognize that "Empire" is 
not politically centered around America while still demanding an 
analysis of American influence over transnational media and capital 
flows-a subject on which the authors have surprisingly little to say. 
Empire and Capital 
Hardt and Negri identify the same unbounded ambition in the 
logic of capitalist expansion. Hardt and Negri outline in detail how 
the logic of capital drives it towards global articulation, borrowing 
from Marx's analysis of the global reach of capitalism. Capital knows 
no limits and thrives by turning the outside into the inside, finding 
new markets, new technologies, and new sources of labor. In that 
process, it ultimately runs up against the limits established by nation-
al boundaries: "Historically, capital has relied on sovereignty and the 
support of its structures of right and force, but those same structures 
continually contradict in principle and obstruct in practice the oper-
ation of capital, finally obstructing its development."25 Hardt and 
a modular expansion and operation over a literally unbounded, hence infinite, expanse. Both 
are forms of openness and unboundedness, but one is the continual incorporation of the new 
rather than the lack of limits. 
23. In recent historical studies, too, Wilson appears the man of the new global order. See, 
e.g., TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUG-
GLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY (1994). 
24. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 175. 
25. Id at 327. 
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Negri argue that we are in the passage from capital dependent on 
sovereignty to capital globalized beyond the reach of national sov-
ereignty .26 
Resistance to Empire 
Empire draws a bleak portrait of the current global order as 
radically opposed to human values and collective priorities. But 
Hardt and Negri seek not only to describe Empire but also to uncov-
er the liberatory possibilities of globalization. They argue that while 
we are driven to "globalization," we are not driven to this particular 
form of it. Rather, we inhabit one of many possible globalisms-an 
insight often missed in the discussion on "globalization." Their target 
is not globalization but this form of it: "[The] enemy ... is a specific 
regime of global relations that we call Empire."21 A general stance a-
gainst globalization "obscures and even negates the real alternatives 
and the potentials for liberation that exist within Empire. "28 
However, it remains unclear what room they leave for anti-im-
perial action, or even for independent human agency, since Empire 
proceeds according to decentered logics independently of any unique 
set of global actors. They argue that Empire generates its own 
resistance: imperial advance emiserates and reconstitutes people in 
new forms of subjectivity, and the restlessness of this "multitude" is 
itself a form of resistance. Hardt and Negri celebrate the circulation 
of people and ideas around the globe, praising hybridity, nomadism, 
desertion, and miscegenation.29 This circulation constitutes the new 
global sociality on which Empire tenuously rests, seeking to cultivate 
for its own ends and yet always needing to check its expansion 
beyond the bounds of the imperial hierarchy. 
Unfortunately, Hardt and Negri never explain how this restless-
ness translates into effective counter-imperial action. We may affirm 
the new forms of sociality, production, and subjectivity accompany-
ing the transition to Empire, and even see them in significant tension 
with the dominant order; but nevertheless, we may also think that a 
meaningful challenge to Empire will require more than restless cre-
ativity alone. 
Towards Counter-Empire 
Hardt and Negri offer few concrete proposals for what they call 
26. Of course, any observer of the recent international financial crises understands the in-
dependence of global capital from national controls. See. e.g., GIDDENS, supra note 3. 
27. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 8, at 45-46. 
28. Id at 46. 
29. Id at 361-364. 
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"Counter-Empire," declaring that imagining alternatives to Empire 
can fall into an entrapping metaphysics, denying the power of people 
to craft their own future: "Only the multitude through its practical 
experimentation will offer the models and determine when and how 
the possible becomes real. "30 Yet, they do suggest the broad outlines 
on which initial struggles may take place, identifying three aims of 
the struggle against Empire: global citizenship, a global basic income, 
and the right of reappropriation of the new sources of productivity-
the electronic networks and knowledge industries. The right to 
global citizenship allows the multitude to control its own movement, 
enfranchising people in an age of massive, transnational migrations. 
The right to a guaranteed basic income generalizes the idea of a "liv-
ing wage" beyond wage labor to include all productivity, all forms of 
work, whether formally remunerative or not.31 Finally, Hardt and 
Negri consider the right of reappropriation to mean free access and 
public control of the new communicative media-the information 
and knowledge industries. 
What are we to make of this picture of Counter-Empire? The 
concrete proposals appear to be a global projection and strengthen-
ing of existing social democratic restraints on capitalism already 
operative in many advanced industrial countries. This is not a criti-
cism but a puzzle. If the first steps toward Counter-Empire are an 
expansion of citizenship, a guaranteed income, and the public appro-
priation of the knowledge industries (public goods perhaps worthy of 
public ownership in any event), is Counter-Empire anything other 
than a deepened social democracy operative on a global stage? And 
if so, why do Hardt and Negri insist on their revolutionary and 
emancipatory Marxist rhetoric?32 Would not an approach that directs 
piecemeal social change towards radical ends- "revolutionary re-
form"33 - better comport both with Hardt and Negri's call for global 
social democracy and their respect for the indeterminacy of counter-
imperial action? 
30. Id at 411. 
31. For more on the basic income, see ARGUING FOR A BASIC INCOME: ETHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS FOR A RADICAL REFORM (Philippe van Parijs ed., 1992); ANDRE GORZ, A 
CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC REASON (1989); MARKET SOCIALISM: THE CURRENT DEBATE 
(Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer eds., 1993); PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR 
ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995). 
32. That is, given that there would be an overlapping consensus among liberals, radicals 
and communists about their proposed move towards a more just form of globalization, why do 
they employ a language that is bound to inhibit such a consensus? 
33. For one approach to "revolutionary reform," see Roberto Mangabeira Unger's three-
volume work Politics, which presents a radical political theory that seeks to moderate the dis-
tinction between context-preserving conflict and revolutionary conflict in the idea of revolu-
tionary reform. For these themes, see in particular ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL 
THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 163-64 (1987). 
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Clearly, Hardt and Negri are weaker when it comes to proscrip-
tion. That said, Empire offers a provocative and theoretically sophis-
ticated description of globalization, a needed corrective to the 
anodyne versions flooding the mainstream media. No wonder the 
diverse cast of anti-globalization protestors have trouble locating a 
coherent core to oppose when the struggle is rather to conceptualize 
alternatives to Empire, especially when such alternatives must be 
open in their scope and more, not less, attractive on that same global 
scale. 

The Canon Has a History 
Legal Canons, J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, eds. New York: 
New York University Press, 2000. Pp. xi, 443. $50.00. 
Richard Primus· 
Legal Canons, edited by J. M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, is a 
collection of fourteen essays on subjects related to canonicity in law 
and legal education.1 Balkin and Levinson have two principal aims. 
One is to expand the category of things that can be canonical: not 
just texts, they say, but also arguments, problems, narrative frame-
works, and examples invoked in conversation or teaching. In their 
view, what makes something canonical is its ability to reproduce 
itself in the minds of successive generations.2 If generation after 
generation of legal academics argues about the countermajoritarian 
difficulty, then the countermajoritarian difficulty is a canonical prob-
lem, and the argumentative moves that are made from generation to 
generation-assuming they are common from one to the next-are 
canonical arguments. Balkin and Levinson's second aim is to argue 
for a more practical kind of expansion, specifically the expansion of 
the canon that defines what is taught to introductory students of 
constitutional law. According to the editors, the present pedagogic 
canon3 is too focused on a few clauses of the Constitution and on 
Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. 
1. LEGAL CANONS (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000). 
2. There are points of contact between this view of canonicity and Balkin's other work on 
"memes," ie., units of cultural knowledge or practice that are transmitted from one generation 
to the next. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 42-90 (1998). 
3. I use the term "pedagogic canon" to refer to the canon that structures what students 
must be taught in constitutional law courses. As Balkin and Levinson point out, this is only one 
of several types of legal canons. There is a "legal authority" canon composed of those texts and 
doctrines that bind courts and with which practicing lawyers must therefore be conversant, but 
there is also a "cultural literacy" canon composed of things that anyone who wishes to partici-
pate in serious discussions about the relevant field must know, as well as an "academic theory" 
canon that defines the world in which law professors conduct contemporary scholarship 
LEGAL CANONS, supra note 1, at 5. These canons overlap: a case like United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), probably belongs in all three. But the canons also diverge. No lawyer 
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opinions of the United States Supreme Court. They urge more atten-
tion to the development of American constitutionalism outside the 
courtroom. Balkin and Levinson's view of constitutional develop-
ment is historically oriented and radically democratic: they wish the 
canon to include materials that will show how all Americans, not just 
judges or even officeholders, have affected the meaning of the Con-
stitution. 
Two of the book's essays are jointly written by Balkin and Levin-
son themselves, and the remaining twelve essays are by other 
scholars. The success of the twelve other essays is uneven. A handful, 
however, do throw light upon what is most provocative in Balkin and 
Levinson's ideas. For example, Carol Rose's essay on the canons of 
"property talk" provides excellent illustrations of how patterns of 
argument can be canonical, shaping a field of law just as pervasively 
as any court decision or other written text.4 Daniel Farber contri-
butes a thoughtful piece arguing that professors who believe law and 
economics to be unhelpful nonsense must nonetheless acquaint their 
students with the field, because law and economics structures the 
thinking of many legal professionals and learning what other legal 
professionals take seriously is essential to becoming an educated 
lawyer.5 (Education is in part the study and critique of canonical 
nonsense.) Katherine Franke's essay "Homosexuals, Torts, and 
Dangerous Things" provides an interesting sketch of how the recent 
emergence of gay and lesbian law as a distinct field with its own 
cano~ical structure in some ways recapitulated and in some ways 
diverged from the pattern by which older legal fields like torts came 
to assume familiar and eventually canonical shapes.6 And Randall 
Kennedy offers a crisp, affirmative program for the integration of 
race relations topics into the pedagogic canon, engaging and criti-
quing the way in which Balkin and Levinson propose to incorporate 
certain kinds of hi~torical materials.7 
One important way to understand Balkin and Levinson's project is 
to read their book as a companion to the constitutional law casebook 
that they edit.8 Certainly Balkin and Levinson conceive of the two 
would cite Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) in a brief, but nobody who does not know 
Lochneris an educated constitutional lawyer. 
4. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone's Anxiety, in LEGAL CANONS, 
supra note 1, at 66. 
5. Daniel A. Farber, Of Coase and the Canon: Reflections on Law and Economics, in 
LEGAL CANONS, supra note 1, at 184. 
6. Katherine M. Franke, Homosexuals, Torts, and Dangerous Things, in LEGAL CANONS, 
supra note 1, at 303. 
7. Ranclall Kennedy, Race Relatio11s Law in the Canon of Legal Academia, in LEGAL 
CANONS, supra note 1, at 211. 
8. PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, 
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books as part of the same project. Casebooks are canon-creators, 
and the preface to this casebook is a six-page methodological essay-
unique among casebooks9-laying out the editors' views about their 
attempt to construct a canon for constitutional law. Quite self-con-
sciously, they want to emphasize different parts of the Constitution 
and different parts of American history from those that have 
generally been taught in constitutional law classes. The historical 
orientation of the casebook is a central feature, and much of the 
book is organized by historical period rather than doctrinal topic. 
Moreover, the history they propose to examine is not all sweetness 
and light. As they make clear in Legal Canons, Balkin and Levinson 
believe more attention should be paid to the role of slavery in 
shaping American constitutional development, and their casebook 
follows through with sections on the constitutional treatment of the 
interstate slave trade, the problem of fugitive slaves, the role of 
slavery in the secession crisis, and the role of slavery in nineteenth-
century attitudes toward judicial supremacy. In the same vein, Balkin 
and Levinson's central example of a historical text that is not 
generally taught but should be is Frederick Douglass's 1860 Glasgow 
speech on the Constitution as an anti-slavery document.10 
The commitment to teaching constitutional law as a historically-
embedded phenomenon is welcome, as is the desire to expand the 
history to which law students are exposed. At the same time, the 
ways in which Balkin and Levinson (and their casebook co-editors, 
Paul Brest and Akhil Amar) choose to reconstruct the pedagogic 
canon raise questions about what kind of fidelity the pedagogic 
enterprise owes to the history of its subject and indeed to the history 
of constitutional pedagogy itself. Constitutional meaning has been 
shaped in part by the kinds of non-judicial material that Balkin and 
Levinson wish to add to the canon, but it has also been shaped by the 
way that constitutional law has been taught to American lawyers 
from decade to decade. Part of the reason why Balkin and Levinson 
want to reform the canon is that they want the next generation to use 
different intellectual tools when constructing constitutional meaning. 
By the same token, the intellectual tools available to previous 
generations have helped determine what the Constitution has meant 
in the past. Accordingly, a historically oriented curriculum must ad-
J.M Balkin, & Akhil Reed Amar, eds., 4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Brest, Levinson]. 
9. I have sampled the most recent editions of the nine other constitutional law casebooks 
on my office shelf and found that they have nineteen pages of preface combined. None of the 
prefaces is even a third as long as that in the most recent edition of Brest, Levinson. 
10. Frederick Douglas, The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-Slavery or Anti-
Slavery? (1860), reprinted in Brest, Levinson, supra note 8, at 207; Balkin & Levinson, Corr 
stitutional Canons and Constitutional Thought, in LEGAL CANONS, supra note 1, at 400-02. 
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dress not only important historical subjects like slavery but also the 
history of the canon itself. 
Consider again the example of Douglass's Glasgow speech. In 
their casebook, Balkin, Levinson, and company reproduce the 
speech as a counterpart to the Supreme Court's decision in Dred 
Scott,1 1 one document interpreting the Constitution as supporting 
slavery and the other interpreting the Constitution as hostile to 
slavery. Teaching Douglass's speech alongside Dred Scott is a terrific 
idea in the service of several pedagogic aims, such as asking students 
(a) how one chooses among conflicting interpretations of the 
Constitution, and perhaps (b) when, if ever, one should intentionally 
misread the Constitution. But historically minded teachers must be 
cautious about how Douglass is presented. Between 1876 and 1995, 
Douglass's speech was not widely known among lawyers or law 
teachers. That piece of history implies that the speech had relatively 
little impact on how people thought about the Constitution during 
those years. Offering a canon that presents Chief Justice Taney and 
Douglass as a yoked pair of opposing constitutional interpreters may 
suggest, somewhat misleadingly, that both interpretive traditions 
have been present in American law down through the ages. Precisely 
because Balkin and Levinson are correct that Douglass's speech has 
not been widely taught, the teacher who now offers Douglass as an 
alternative to Taney must take care to convey that this material was 
not taught to prior generations of law students. Otherwise, students 
who try to understand the struggles over race and the Constitution in 
1896 or 1964 may misapprehend the conceptual landscape that 
presented itself to the people who shaped constitutional meanings at 
those times. The history of the canon is itself a key part of constitu-
tional development, and historically oriented scholars must integrate 
that history into whatever new pedagogic canon they promote. 
11. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
Chinese Justice: 
The Fiction, the Facts, the Favoritism 
Jeffrey C. Kinkley, Chinese Justice, The Fiction: Law and Literature 
in Modern China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi, 
497. $70.50. 
Rebecca Weiner 
Jeffrey Kinkley's Chinese Justice, The Fiction is an ambitious 
book. He seeks to summarize China's rich history of largely 
untranslated detective fiction, while describing China's evolving legal 
system and drawing parallels between them. Further, Kinkley claims 
"theoretical aspirations": 
Through crime fiction, I hope to illuminate China's new legal 
culture (the thought and habits affecting legal behavior) and the 
predicament of all modern Chinese literature. Relevant to the 
latter are its historical and social contexts, modes of genre for-
mation, and social levels; buffeting by party, state and patriotic 
norms; and relations to other institutions and ideas.1 
It's a tall order. 
Kinkley delivers on several fronts, not least by sharing his ency-
clopedic knowledge of the genre. Though not described in linear 
fashion, a story emerges with all the plot twists of a good detective 
novel. China was one of the birthplaces of crime writing, through 
casebooks and annotated law codes of the Yuan (1271-1368) and 
Ming (1368-1644) Dynasties, and through poems, operas (and later, 
novels) lionizing the exploits of investigator-judges like Lord Bao. 
Collectively (though, as Kinkley says, somewhat inaccurately), these 
1. JEFFREY KINKLEY, CHINESE JUSTICE, THE FICTION: LAW AND LITERATURE IN MOD-
ERN CHINA 4 (2000). 
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early writings are often referred to as gongan, "court case" liter-
ature.2 
The late nineteenth century saw rich cross-fertilization, as Conan 
Doyle was translated into Chinese, and French crime writers like 
Emile Gaboriau may have read translated gongan. This encounter 
created the "Golden Age" of Chinese detective fiction (roughly 
1900-1949). At least two top Golden Age writers-Cheng Xiaoqing 
and Sun Liaohong-deliberately recreated Western detective icons. 
Cheng's Huo Sang was "China's Sherlock Holmes,"3 while Sun's 
burglar-detective Lu Ping honored the French anti-Holmes Arsene 
Lupin. 
After the 1949 revolution bringing the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) to power, detective fiction was banned in favor of militaristic 
tales about "class enemies," because in New China, both "popular 
genres and the very subject of crime were taboo."4 Only when polit-
ical and economic reforms began in 1979 did crime fiction return-
from republication of old gongan and of translated foreign stories, to 
new detective works by Chinese authors, many of them offshoots of 
post-Cultural Revolution "scar literature." Kinkley discusses "scar 
literature" whose hero-investigators have often been unfairly impris-
oned- and in which the bad guys are usually linked to the Gang of 
Four. 
With China's 1983 campaign against "spiritual pollution," hard-
boiled "political" crime writing was banned. Other forms prolif-
erated-from "literary crime" to "science-fiction mysteries" (would 
you believe a cloned agent's brain being frozen with a "miracle 
knife" to extract secret formulae?). In an Orwellian twist, China's 
Public Security Bureaus (PSBs) also joined the fray, commissioning 
and publishing what increasingly was called "legal system liter-
ature,"5 featuring PSB heroes. After 1989, such "police literature" 
came for a time to be the only authorized crime literature in China. 
There Kinkley ends his historical survey: "Since Communism origin-
ally banished both law and literature as we know them, it is ironic 
that it later wedded them in an official genre. "6 
Along the way he explores the interplay of legal literature and law. 
He plays with inter-textual commentaries by Chinese literati on both 
literature and law. He muses on how casebooks (which took the 
place of law codes in much of ancient China) were read as litera-
2. Id at 28. 
3. Id at 170. 
4. Id at 244. 
5. Id at 296. 
6. Id at 315. 
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ture-while modern "legal system literature" helped educate judges, 
cops, and lawyers-literature thus shaping law. Reviewing political 
interference in both literature and law, Kinkley concludes that both 
represent "incontestable and non-adversarial moral truth that serves 
the sovereign-today, the CCP."7 
With all that, this book makes worthwhile reading, even if the style 
is at times overwrought. Kinkley's avoidance of linear chronology, 
for instance, was perhaps intended to deconstruct hegemonic narra-
tive norms, but his taxonomy is confusing. His division of the book 
into chapters on Origins, Traditions, Shadows, and so on requires 
frequent circling back through historical periods and topics: at least 
four subsections deal with "high" versus "low" fiction, three are 
titled "Law in Literature," two "Law as Literature," and one "Law · 
into Literature." 
Kinkley clearly favors narratives that are Western, logical, and 
law-based, featuring individual heroes as opposed to Eastern, emo-
tional tales that are morality-based, and feature idealized teams. 
Even "the Westernized delights of Cheng Xiaoqing's [imitation 
Sherlock Holmes] stories do not preclude Chinese touches, including 
outright didacticism,"8 Kinkley opines. He quotes Edward Said, but 
nevertheless indulges in orientalisme. Western is "we," Chinese 
always "they" - the Other. Kinkley denigrates as "traditionally Chi-
nese" the tendency to copy narratives, "insouciantly changing details 
or not as the spirit moved them, in the absence of the concept of 
plagiarism,"9 as if Western writers from Shakespeare down have not 
retold old tales. 
Kinkley also comments often and at length, on "melodramatic" 
Chinese plots. But he never deals with the issue outright, exploring 
the roots of Chinese love of melodrama (historic lack of a middle 
class to popularize "refined" tastes comes to mind, as does Confu-
cian reverence for moral lessons). Instead, he simply denigrates story 
after story. An accused counter-revolutionary getting saved by the 
fall of the Gang of Four "seems a cheap political coup de theatre." 10 
Corruption by children of senior officials is "hackneyed" and "for-
mulaic."11 A heroic cop's tale is "primitive and propagandistic."12 The 
publication of Wang Yaping's Sacred Duty in 1980, just at the start 
of the reform era, imposed significant risks to both author and pub-
7. Id. at 103. 
8. Id. at 193. 
9. Id. at 179-80. 
10. Id. at 8. 
11. Id.at65. 
12. Id. at 88. 
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lishers, as Kinkley notes. It was (by his own description) the first scar 
literature involving penal law, and the first to depict prison camps 
and torture. Yet Kinkley calls Sacred Duty "melodramatic" eight 
times in four pages.13 
Kinkley's disparagement of stories as melodrama is biased accord-
ing to content, not merely style. For instance, the Li Dong/Wang 
Yungao story The Trial involves a trial for negligent homicide, 
conducted by an upright prosecutor, of a cadre who had saved the 
prosecutor's life in the Cultural Revolution. The cadre comes to 
repent his sin when it transpires that one of those killed by his 
negligence was an old man who had saved the cadre's life in the Civil 
War. Melodrama? Not a peep.14 Again, with stories he does not like, 
Kinkley infantilizes the titles Jao and xiao ("Old" and "Little") as 
"Ole"' and "Li'l" in his translations. But these are common honor-
ifics across China, not hick local idioms as Kinkley implies. Notably, 
in describing adversarial stories such as The Trial, and the "Western-
ized delights" of Cheng Xiaoqing, he refrains. 
More serious is Kinkley's one-sided commentary on the complexi-
ties of adversarial versus Confucian/paternal law. Many have written 
on the strengths of China's traditional view of justice as centered in 
individual/family responsibility/morality, with law a second-best to 
values-based education. Kinkley has clearly read some of this dis-
cussion. He quotes from William Alford, for instance,15 without men-
tioning Alford's dictum that many in the West could learn from 
China's ranking of fa ("law") lower in the hierarchy of forces sup-
porting justice than tian ("heaven" or "nature"), Ji ("rites" or "ritual/ 
worship"), qing ("traditional morality") and jiao ("education"). 16 
Many legal actors have come to the same conclusion. U.S. District 
Judge Helen Ginger Berrigan wrote glowingly after her judicial tour 
of China and co-hosting of a reciprocal delegation of Chinese judges 
organized by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.11 
"For thousands of years," Judge Berrigan observes, "China stressed 
communal harmony and relied upon village elders to pass down wise 
decisions on disputes, which villagers have accepted to avoid discord. 
In our legal system, we call that arbitration or mediation, and are 
13. Id at 88-92. 
14. See id. at 118-26. 
15. Jdat 14. 
16. WILLIAM ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 14 (1995). 
17. Helen Ginger Berrigan, China Judicial Exchange: "I Think This Is the Start of a 
Beautiful Friendship," NCUSCR NEWSLETTER (National Committee on U.S.-China Rela-
tions, New York, NY), Spring/Summer 2001, at 4. 
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only now developing it as an alternative to the often overly adversar-
ial and individualistic system we use. "18 
Of course China's Confucian/paternalistic justice has been and is 
abused. The New York Times has covered China's most recent 
"Strike Hard" campaign, with its cases of suspects denied lawyers 
until police extracted confessions, sometimes via torture.19 But 
American adversarialism has also been abused: Chinese papers rou-
tinely cover U.S. criminals who get off on technicalities and go on to 
commit further crimes. Mutual finger-pointing has little effect. More 
useful are legal exchange initiatives that help bring out the best, and 
blunt the roughest edges, in both systems. 
Perhaps few legal thinkers familiar with today's China would be as 
eager as Kinkley to throw out baby with bathwater. He equates qing 
and Ji with CCP dictums (as if no non-party morality remains in 
China).20 He despises "the pernicious idea of natural law"21 and "the 
paternalistic party,"22 while calling adversarial justice both "West-
ern" and "modern" (terms he uses largely interchangeably), praising 
"stirrings of the adversarial spirit"23 in Wang Yaping's and other 
stories. To be sure, "adversarialism means tolerance of variant ver-
sions of the truth,"24 a virtue China could use more of. But it is per-
haps not always true that "in setting precedents, adversarial lawyers 
serve collective interests."25 What grates is Kinkley's simplistic equa-
tion of Adversarial with Western with Modern with Always Best. 
This is especially true given his broad-brush negatives about 
Chinese legal practice. He ends his fiction survey in 1989, but makes 
more sweeping claims about Chinese justice. For instance: "By all 
accounts, Chinese judicial organs are rubber stamps today."26 Kink-
ley supports this with footnotes dating to 1979. The situation "today" 
(for a book published in 2000) is significantly different, by many 
accounts. Professor Yang Yuguan at the Chinese University of Poli-
tics and Law agrees that "China's court system is different from its 
American counterpart.' Judges in China may discuss some cases with 
their colleagues or consult with their seniors."27 But then, Yang 
18. Id. 
19. See. e.g., Craig Smith, Chinese Fight Crime with Torture and Executions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 9, 2001, at 1. 
20. KINKLEY, supra note 1, at 125. 
21. Id. at 126. 
22. Id. at 331. 
23. Id. at 99. 
24. Id. at 13. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 76. 
27. E-mail from Yang Yuguan, Professor, Chinese University of Politics and Law, to 
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writes, China's court brief is also broader, including not just criminal 
and civil justice, but also "economic dispute settlement" and "social 
stability."28 Yang calls it "illogical to conclude that a country with 
China's population could exist with "rubber stamp" judicial or-
gans. "29 
Again, this is not to minimize the problems. Having reopened law 
schools in 1979 and passed a lawyer's law in 1996, China's rule of law 
remains an evolving, two-steps-forward, one-step-back dance. No 
one would claim China has already fully achieved rule-of-law, but 
few deny that progress has been made. Yet Kinkley's broad-brush 
statements seem to ignore those hard-won gains and all the struggles 
that created them. Once more, I turn to Judge Berrigan for balance: 
"Everywhere our group traveled in China, we found men and 
women trying to do the "just" thing, regardless of historic and 
philosophical differences, just as I see people in America doing."30 
Jeffrey Kinkley has brought encyclopedic knowledge and 
impressive intellectual tools to an under-studied field rich with inter-
pretive potential. His flea-hopping between topics and periods, even 
his one-sided views on traditional values and recent progress, do not 
diminish that achievement. This is an important new book in critical 
studies of Chinese law and literature. I believe, however, it would 
have been a more enjoyable and ultimately more enduring book, had 
Kinkley approached his splendidly rich topic with slightly less jumpy 
erudition and a bit more balance. 
Rebecca Weiner (Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with author). 
28. Id at 2. 
29. Id 
30. Berrigan, supra note 17, at 5. 
